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ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
     This diversity action primarily against two municipalities implicates 
the New 
Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3 (Act).  Because the facts 
are known to the 
parties, we refer to them briefly.   
     In August 1997, Theodora Penny (Theodora) was vacationing in the 
Borough of 
Wildwood Crest, New Jersey.  As she attempted to cross Sweet Briar Road at 
the corner 
of New Jersey Avenue, she claims that she fell because of a declivity in 
the surface of the 
crosswalk.  The crosswalk is nothing more than an area marked for purposes 
of walking 
across the road by painted stripes.  The depressed area of the crosswalk 
was part of a 
street patch that measured approximately six feet six inches in length and 
five feet two 
inches in width, of which approximately one foot by five feet protruded 
into the 
crosswalk.  Within this protrusion, the declivity in the crosswalk 
measured approximately 
one inch to one and five-eighth inches.  Mrs. Penny sustained multiple 
fractures to her left 
wrist that required the insertion of a metal plate and screws.   
     Mrs. Penny and her husband, James M. Penny, Jr., filed an action 
under 28 U.S.C. 
 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) in the United States District Court for 
the District Court of 
New Jersey against the Borough of Wildwood Crest (Borough), the City of 
Wildwood 
and the City of Wildwood Water Department (City).  The Borough and the 
City 
separately moved for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiffs have 
failed to 
satisfy the statutory requirements that the defendants' conduct was 
"palpably 
unreasonable."  The District Court agreed and concluded that "it was not 
palpably 
unreasonable for the  Defendants to fail to inspect, detect, or repair the 
'depression' at 
issue."  The plaintiffs timely appealed. We affirm.   
     Our review of the District Court's grant of summary judgment is 
plenary.  
Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 632 (3d Cir. 1996).  Summary 
judgment 
is proper if after considering "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, . . . there is 
no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and . . .  the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law."  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In conducting that review, the nonmoving party is 
entitled to all 
reasonable inferences and the record is construed in the light most 
favorable to that party.  
Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (1986).   
     An issue is genuine if "there is sufficient evidence favoring the 
nonmoving party 
for a jury to return a verdict for that party."  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 248 (1986).  As such, summary judgment against a party who bears the 
burden of 
proof at trial, as do the plaintiffs here, is proper if "after adequate 
time for discovery and 
upon motion, . . . a party . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence 
of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will 
bear the burden 
of proof at trial."  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  
Under such 
circumstances, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, 
where "complete 
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's 
case 
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."  Id. at 323.  Therefore, 
the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party has 
failed to make a 
sufficient showing on an essential element of the case with respect to 
which he or she has 
the burden of proof.  Id.        
     The New Jersey Supreme Court in Willis v. Department of Conservation 
& 
Economic Development, 264 A.2d 34 (1970) abrogated the sovereign tort 
immunity  
existing at common law.  In response, the New Jersey Legislature enacted 
the New Jersey 
Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, reestablishing sovereign 
immunity and 
carefully delineating narrow exceptions to the general rule of immunity.  
Vincitore v. 
New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth., 777 A.2d 9, 12 (N.J. 2001).  One of 
those 
exceptions is N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  Most recently, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court 
summarized the elements of a claim under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 as follows:  
     [I]n order to impose liability on a public entity pursuant to that 
section, a plaintiff 
     must establish [1] the existence of a "dangerous condition," [2] that 
the condition 
     proximately caused the injury, [3] that it "created a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of 
     the kind of injury which was incurred," [4] that either the dangerous 
condition was 
     caused by a negligent employee or the entity knew about the 
condition, and [5] 
     that the entity's conduct was "palpably unreasonable." 
      
Id. (emphasis added).   
     Although "palpably unreasonable" is not defined in the Act, the New 
Jersey 
Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase to mean something more than mere 
negligence.  
Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 497 A.2d 183, 187 (N.J. 1985) ("We have no doubt 
that the duty of 
ordinary care, the breach of which is termed negligence, differs in degree 
from the duty to 
refrain from palpably unreasonable conduct.  The latter standard implies a 
more obvious 
and manifest breach of duty and imposes a more onerous burden on the 
plaintiff.") 
(quoting Williams v. Phillipsburg, 408 A.2d 827 (App. Div. 1979); Pico v. 
New Jersey, 
560 A.2d 1193, 1997 (N.J. 1989) (stating that claim under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 
is evaluated 
under standard of palpably unreasonable conduct and not by standard of 
ordinary 
negligence).  Also, the Kolitch court stated that "palpably unreasonable" 
involves 
behavior that is "patently unacceptable under any given circumstances" and 
involves 
action or inaction that is so unreasonable that "it must be manifest and 
obvious that no 
prudent person would approve."  Kolitch, 497 A.2d at 187 (citation 
omitted).  
     Initially, the plaintiffs complain that the "District Court decided 
that it should play 
the role of the prudent person" and thereby, impermissibly took the issue 
of palpably 
unreasonable conduct from the jury.  We do not agree.  Although the New 
Jersey 
Supreme Court has stated that the question of palpably unreasonable 
conduct is a question 
of fact, it has also recognized that "like any other fact question before 
a jury, [such 
determination] is subject to the court's assessment whether it can 
reasonably be made 
under the evidence presented."  Vincitore, 777 A.2d at 12, 16 (citation 
omitted).  
Likewise, Justice Stein in his concurrence in Garrison v. Township of 
Middletown, 712 
A.2d 1101, 1116 (N.J. 1998) acknowledged that "[a]lthough the question of 
palpable 
unreasonableness is generally one for the jury, it may be decided by the 
court as a matter 
of law in appropriate cases."  That is what the District Court did in this 
instance.   
     The plaintiffs simply have not offered any admissible evidence that 
would enable 
a reasonable jury to find that "the action the entity took to protect 
against the condition or 
the failure to take such action was . . . palpably unreasonable."  
N.J.S.A. 59:4-2.  The 
plaintiffs contend that the Borough could have avoided the depression from 
being part of 
the crosswalk by painting the western crosswalk one and one-half feet to 
the east.  The 
failure to do so, they argue, amounts to patently unreasonable behavior to 
protect the 
public from a dangerous condition.  As to the City of Wildwood, plaintiffs 
submit that the 
City's failure to properly train its employees and leaving them 
unsupervised when they 
performed an excavation was palpably unreasonable conduct to protect 
against a 
dangerous condition.  We do not agree. 
     In Garrison, the plaintiff had argued that a failure to repair a one 
inch to one and 
half inch declivity in the surface of a parking lot next to a transit 
station was palpably 
unreasonable.  Justice Stein in his concurrence pointed out that such 
minor declivity 
"must necessarily be viewed as a maintenance item of low priority" and in 
the absence of 
other evidence in the record of prior complaints or prior injuries, there 
is "insufficient 
evidence to permit a rational factfinder to conclude that the . . . 
failure to correct the 
surface declivity in the parking lot was palpably unreasonable."  Garrison 
712 A.2d at 
1116.   
     Here, the plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence of any prior 
complaints or 
accidents.  The plaintiffs contend that the crosswalk could have been 
designed to exclude 
the irregular surface from its pathway or that the City failed to properly 
train or supervise 
its employees to avoid creating depressions in areas they excavate.  
However, no 
reasonable jury could find that a failure to repair such surface declivity 
having a depth of 
one inch to one and five-eighth inches amounts to anything more than 
ordinary 
negligence.  To put it differently, based on the current evidence, the 
District Court did not 
err in concluding that the failure of the Borough or the City to protect 
against the irregular 
paving was not "patently unacceptable under any given circumstances" and 
did not 
involve action or inaction that was so unreasonable that "it must be 
manifest and obvious 
that no prudent person would approve of its course of action or inaction." 
     In light of our ultimate disposition here, we need not consider 
whether the District 
Court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to adduce 
sufficient evidence to 
show that the Borough had notice of the dangerous condition, or its 
finding with respect 
to the City that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the depression in 
the crosswalk was a 
dangerous condition.  Nor do we discuss the plethora of alternative 
grounds of affirmance 
that the Borough and the City advance in their briefs.  
     The judgments of the District Court will be affirmed.  Costs taxed 
against the 
appellants. 
                             
TO THE CLERK: 
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